David De Angelis
David De Angelis is an assistant professor of finance at the Bauer College of Business. Prior to joining the University of Houston, he was an assistant professor of finance at Rice University. He did his doctoral studies at Cornell University and his primary research interests are in corporate finance and corporate governance.
Dr. De Angelis' research revolves around the design of governance mechanisms. In particular, one theme of his research investigates the factors that affect the design of CEO compensation contracts. The other theme of his research studies debt contracts and the role of creditors in corporate governance.
His research has been published in leading academic journals, such as the Journal of Finance, Review of Financial Studies, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Review of Finance, and Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. He received the W. F. Sharpe Award for the Best Paper in the 2020 Volume of the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.
- Relative Performance Evaluation in CEO Compensation: A Talent-Retention Explanation (with Yaniv Grinstein), Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 55 (2020), 2099-2123. (Lead Article and Winner of the W. F. Sharpe Award for the Best Paper in the 2020 Volume of the JFQA.)
- Debt Contracting on Management (with Brian Akins and Maclean Gaulin), The Journal of Finance 75 (2020), 2095-2137.
- The Effects of Short-Selling Threats on Incentive Contracts: Evidence from an Experiment (with Gustavo Grullon and Sébastien Michenaud), The Review of Financial Studies 30 (2017), 1627-1659.
- Input Hedging, Output Hedging, and Market Power (with Abraham Ravid), Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 26 (2017), 123-151.
- Performance Terms in CEO Compensation Contracts (with Yaniv Grinstein), Review of Finance 19 (2015), 619-651.